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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE IN SOUTH ASIA: TESTS OF 
CAUSALITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE 
Robert E. Looney 
Naval Postgraduate School, National Security Affairs 
INTRODUCTION 
The growth in world military expenditure is the supreme 
paradox of our age. While it is reasonable and prudent for a 
nation to make provision for security against external threats, 
one nation's security is likely to be another's insecurity. As a 
result, particularly in an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion, 
military expenditure assumes a competitive dynamic. The net 
result is a reduction in security for all nations. The realization 
that this bizarre process consumes huge quantities of resources 
with high opportunity cost in terms of the possibility of achiev-
ing higher standards of living is only slightly less disquieting 
(Treddenick, 1985: 77). 
To date, economists have had relatively little to say about 
the causes and consequences of arms races, particularly those in 
the Third World. This neglect is surprising in that arms races 
have to do with resource allocations in a complex and competi-
tive environment. 
The purpose of this paper is to add this economic dimension 
through an examination of the interdependence between arms 
races and economic allocation in a developing world context. In 
this regard, India and Pakistan provide an ideal case study be-
cause of their interdependence from a geographic, economic, 
political, and social point of view (Chatterji, 1968: 87). Based on 
this analysis, several general conclusions follow concerning the 
causes and costs of the region's long-standing arms race. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In recent years an increasing number of studies of defense 
expenditures have used regression models with military expen-
diture as the dependent variable. These models encompass a 
variety of different types of data: mainly longitudinal time series 
for the advanced countries, and cross-country cross-sectional for 
the developing nations. These studies use a variety of theories 
about the character of the decision-making process and the 
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~levance of various military, political, and economic influences 
perating at domestic, regional, or global levels (Smith, 1989: 346). 
Until quite recently, conventional wisdom held that strate-
ic factors dominate year-to-year variations in Third World 
efense expenditures. Traditionally, strategic variables have 
1cluded such diverse elements as armed conflicts, arms races, 
nd alliances. The public good feature of military expenditures 
rithin alliances represents a major area of research based on 
b.e classic work of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). 
Internal influences include economic, bureaucratic, and 
1olitical factors. The most direct economic factors are income 
nd prices. National income, within fairly broad limits, con· 
trains what a country can afford, while the relative cost of 
:iilitary provision will influence budgetary choices. Indirect 
conomic factors include the need to stabilize slemand, control 
1ublic expenditure, or subsidize industrial research and develop· 
:ient. Bureaucratic explanations emphasize "incrementalism," 
1argaining over the budget starting from the status quo. Politi-
al influences range from lobbying by the military-industrial 
omplex and other interest groups to the ideological position of 
he government (Smith, 1989: 346- 4 7). 
Recent empirical studies (Looney, 1989, 1990; Looney and 
liehay, 1990) have confirmed the importance of economic vari-
Lbles in structuring budgetary allocations to the military. One 
•ariant of this approach stresses the significance of Military 
Ceynesianism-the use of military expenditures as a counter· 
yclical tool. For example, Griffin, Wallace, and Devine (1982: 
.4) concluded that in the United States between 1949 and 1976, 
military outlays [as a percentage of GNP] do appear to be 
:mployed as a counter-cyclical fiscal instrument by the state." 
Treddenick's (1985) analysis of Canadian military expendi-
ures demonstrated that economic imperatives often affect the 
evel and composition of a nation's allocations to defense. In this 
:ontext, defense expenditures are often independent of any 
iecurity considerations. Here, the real reason for increased 
nilitary expenditures is to promote economic objectives. Howev-
ir, for political reasons governments justify those expenditures as 
)roviding for national security. Treddenick (1985: 77) concluded 
hat: "large increases in Canadian defense expenditures have been 
.n:fluenced more by economic than security considerations." 
More recently, Maizels and Nissanke (1986) examined mili-
;ary spending data for 83 countries. They hypothesized that the 
- . , ' 
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determinants of government d ? .appear to be major 
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expenditures from dom t. m~asure the effect of military 
examined the budgets ~:i~ ec~~om1c conditions. In doing so he 
countries: Indonesia M l ce . e early 1960s) in five ASEAN 
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getary position in the pyrear. and the government's bud-
2 ev1ous year . 
. Curr:nt defense expenditures h . . 
correlation with inflation th . ave a weak Inverse 
3 Alth e previous year. 
. ough there were no corr l t. 
defense expenditures and th eb a Ions between current 
the previous year the bal e alance of payments in 
' ance of paym t af government revenue h. h . en s fects 
spending. ' w IC m turn affects defense 
In an extension of the H . 
sen (1~88), using time seri:-r~a~aper, Lo?ney and Frederik-
determmants of defense expe d"t a, e~am1ned the economic 
countries: Argentina Peru M n. I ures In ten Latin American 
tf ruguay, Colombia, 'srazii ::ix1co, Venezuela, ~hile, Paraguay, 
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lagged values of GNP en variables specified as current and 
d" ' government exp d"t ~xpen itures, they found (468)- "al en I ure, and military 
m defense expenditures can be .ex ~ge proportion of variability 
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,etween countries as to the timing of increased defense alloca-
ions. Specifically, Thailand exhibited a weak stabilization 
>attern. Korean defense expenditure patterns followed a long-
'Un distributed lag function. For Thailand there was a weak 
;tabilization effect. Indonesia represented a special case. Here, 
c:rude oil production produced the best measure of resource 
availability. Still, there was a weak augmentation effect as 
measured by the expected and unexpected rate of inflation. 
Clearly, many countries experience periods during which 
economic variables constrain or at least modify the volume of 
resources allocated to defense. However, an alternate interpreta-
tion is also plausible-that defense expenditures themselves 
influence the economic environment and so, future allocations to 
the military (Looney, 1989c). One also might imagine that the 
underlying cause of defense allocations would at least in part 
influence the manner in which they affect the domestic economy 
(Maizels and Nissanke, 1986). Specifically, expenditures under-
taken for Keynesian reasons should ceteris paribus impact 
positively on the economy. Similarly, those undertaken as a 
response to increased militarization in neighboring countries are 
much less likely to produce positive economic benefits. 
The analysis below attempts to combine these two consider-
ations: (a) the causes, and (b) the consequences of defense. Our 
purpose is to identify the patterns of causation between Indian 
and Pakistani defense expenditures. Having established this 
interrelationship we wish to examine the connection between 
arms races in the region and national economic performance. In 
doing so, we will test the five main hypotheses underlying the 
empirical literature summarized above: 
1. Defense Causes Growth. The implicit assumption in 
a number of earlier studies such as Benoit (1973), 
Rothschild (1977), Frederiksen and Looney (1983, 
1983a, 1985), Looney and Frederiksen (1986), Deger 
and Sen (1983), Leontief and Dutchin (1983), and Lim 
(1983) is that defense spending occurs prior to and 
causes economic growth. 
2. Defense is Growth Neutral. Biswas and Ram's (1986) 
hypothesis is that defense spending neither helps nor 
hurts economic growth; the two are independent of 
each other. 
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fense spending· Harris (1986) 
eriksen (1990) ~gue that th ~d Looney and Fred-
cally receive the extra e mi itary may systemati-
growth. resources provided by economic 
4. Defense and Growth A l 
one way causality a ~ dreb nkterrelated. Rather than 
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ALTERNATIVE TESTS FOR CAUSATION 
Several statistical tests . 
issue at hand. To date th ~~ available for addressing the 
been the Granger Test.' e ongmal and most widely used has 
Granger Test 
Granger (1969) defines al"t 
causes (G-C) y if y can be cau~ I y such that X Granger 
sense of mean square erro pr~~1cted more accurately in the 
than without using past X rF w1 the us~ of past values of X 
tionship (the same basic f~ or ex~ple, m assessing the rela-
race between the count~ rm) ublation also applies to the arms 
rf, •.es etween de~ d pe ormance, LaCivita and Fr d . ense an economic 
Granger causality can be ~f.erd1ksen (1987) demonstrate that 
spec1 ie as: 
p q 
GDP,=?, a, GDP,_,+ Lb. DEF +u 
IEJ J•J J t-j t (1) 
r 
DE -~ s 
'F, - LJ c, DEF,_,+ L d. GDP + v 
l•l /•1 J t-J t (2) 
__ ,_ 
,... ....... T'"\ ~ - ...L ,_ - ,, __ - - - " - -
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fense expenditures; p, q, r, ands are lag lengths for each vari· 
able in the equation; and u and v represent serially uncorrelated 
white noise residuals. By assuming that the error terms (u, v) 
are "nice" we estimate the specified model by the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method.1 Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, 
a joint F-test is commonly used for causal detection. Here, the 
F-statistic is: 
F 
(RSSx -RSS11) / (dfx -d/11) 
RSS11 I d/11 
(3) 
where RSSx and RSSu are the residual sum of squares of re· 
stricted and unrestricted models, respectively; and dfx and dfu 
are, respectively, the degrees of freedom in restricted and unre· 
To examine Granger-causality between GDP and DEF, we stricted models. 
test the following hypotheses: bi=O, j=l. .q and di=O, j=l. .s. If the 
former hypothesis is rejected but the latter is not, DEF causes 
GDP; whereas if the latter is rejected and the former is not, 
GDP causes DEF. If both are rejected, then there is a feedback 
between GDP and DEF. Failure to reject either of the two null 
hypotheses implies independence between these two variables. 
F-tests are used to test for the presence of Granger-causal rela·, 
tions. One criticism of this procedure is the possibility of biases 
due to the omission of independent variables (Guilkey and Sa· 
lemi, 1982). However Yamada (1985) has shown that it is very 
costly in terms of degrees of freedom to include more variables 
and/or more lags in the system when (as in the present case) 
only a small number of observations are available to test the 
Granger causality. The Granger test typically employs the same lag length for 
all variables. This presents a potential problem. There is no a 
priori reason to believe that the same lag length is appropriate 
1 
If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates 
would be inefficient, although still unbiased, and would distort the causal relations. 
The existence of serial correlation was checked by using a maximum likelihood 
correlation for the first-order autocorrelation of the residuals (AR(l)]. The compari· 
son of both OLS and AR(l) results indicated that no signiQcant changes appeared in 
causal directions. Therefore, we can conclude "roughly" that serial correlation was 
not serious in this model. 
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where T is the sample size, and FPEm and ESSm are the final 
prediction error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The 
optimal lag length, m •, is the lag length that produces the 
lowest FPE. Having determined m •, the next step estimates the 
equation with the lags on the other variable added sequentially 
in the same manner used to determine m •. Thus we estimate 
four regressions of the form: 
m• n 
GDP,=a+ L bt-l+GDPt-1+ L ct-1 DEFt-l+e1 (6) 
l•l l•l 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction 
error for each regression as: 
FPE = T+m•+n+l ESS / T 
m•,n T-m• -n -1 m•,n ,(7) 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length that 
produces the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to 
determine lag length is equivalent to using a series of F tests 
with variable levels of significance.2 
The first term measures the estimation error, and the 
second term measures the modelling error. The FPE criterion 
has a certain optimality property that (Hsiao, 1979: 326) ''bal· 
ances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected and the 
risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is 
selected." As noted by Judge et al. (1982), an intuitive reason for 
using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first 
term but decrease the RSS of the second term, and thus the two 
opposing forces are balanced optimally when their product 
reaches its minimum. 
Again, using the example of defense and economic perfor· 
mance, four cases are possible: (a) Defense Causes Growth-
occurring when the prediction error for growth is reduced when 
defense is added to the equation. In addition, when growth is 
added to the defense equation, the final prediction error increas· 
es; (b) Growth Causes Defense-occurring when the prediction 
error of growth increases when defense is added to the regres· 
sion equation for growth, and is reduced when growth is added 
to the regression equation for defense; (c) Feedback-occurring 
when the final prediction error decreases when defense is added 
2 Since F-statistics are redundant in this instance they are not reported here. 
Thev are. however. available Crom the author unon reouest. 
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. final rediction error decreases 
to the growth .equ;1i~t~:e t~:fense :quation; and (d) .No Rela-
when growth is ~ e th fi al prediction error increases 
tionship-occurrmg when e i~h equation and also increas-
when defense is ~dded to t~oe t~; defense equ~tion. As a caveat, 
es when growth is adde~l 1 ut the possibility that contern-
our tests do not ne~es3san y X:x~s~ between the two variables 
poraneous causality can. 1981· 91). 
(Gupta, 1987: 196; and Hsiao, t• . would hold in examining 
th ame conven ions . Of course, es I d. and Pakistani defense 
· h · between n ian 
the causal relations ip ld th procedures outlined above 
. H re we cou use e 
expenditures. e . . . . d an follow-on factors character-
to assess both the mitiatm: ~ n ihe two countries. 
izing possible arms rac~·t e :e~ are sensitive to lag lengths. 
In summary, caus i :an :ctually existed may distort the 
The use of shorter lags t d·tures on economic growth (or 
causal impact of defense ethxpenth1 hand using relatively long 
. 1 s) On eo er , d regiona arms race . rt b tween defense expenditures an 
lags may mask any causa i Yd. e h e used an "atheoretical" 
. wth Few stu ies av . t 
economic gro . d t themselves to select appropria e 
methodology that allo~ . a (1979 1981) we use Akaike's final 
lag lengths. Following siaol t 'timm:i lag lengths for each 
prediction error (FPE). to se ec op 
variable in each equation. 
METHODOLOGY out the 
·1·t expenditures used to carry The data for mi i ary t. al Peace Re· the Stockholm Interna ion 
Hsiao tests are from y; b k' United States Arms Control 
search Institute, SIPRI e~ ~~A mamentsandDisarmament. 
andDisarmamentAgency, ort. ~oduct and other macroeco· 
Annual data on Gross Domes. ic . of the International 
. bl from various issues 
nomic varia es are . l Fi ancial Statistics Yearbook. 
Monetary Fund, Intematwtna ne not available the defense 
. t · defla ors wer ' . When consisten pnce f . GDP) replaced defense expendi· 
burden (the share of de ense .m 
tures in the estimated equttion~.derations remain. First, most 
At this point~ severa con:i t• ary As shown by Judge et 
economic time senes are non-s a ion . 
s involving definitions have crept into the 
a A number of conceptu~l pro~~~ (1979) ifX and y co-exist, then Xis said to 
causality literature. Accordmg ~ l~ e non-existence ofY. Hicks developed two 
cause y if the non-existe~ce ofX i~plt; ::ntemporaneous causality and (b) sequen· 
n>Ain>' nRt.t.el'IlS of causahtv. name Y a 
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al. (1982: 671), "stationary is an important property as it guar-
antees that there are no fundamental changes in the structure 
of the process that would render prediction difficult or ~possi· 
ble." To remove all possible non-stationarities, we defin~d real 
defense expenditures and real income variables in terms of their 
rates of growth. The coefficients of these variables regressed on 
a constant and time were insignificantly different from zero for 
all countries. Similar regressions of the untransformed levels 
suggested a trend. 
Second, Sims (1972) has provided an alternative estimation 
procedure. As Feige and Pearce (1979) and others have pointed 
out, Sims' procedure is equivalent to Granger's once stationarity 
and invertibility conditions are assumed to be satisfied. Sims' 
formulation of the test procedure consists in regressing filtered 
variable Y on past, present, and future values of the ()ther 
filtered variable, X, and testing jointly for the significance of the 
coefficients of future X's. We rejected the Sims test for the 
estimates below because as Gupta (1987: 197) notes: ", .. the 
existence of a systematic expectation. mechanism of future 
depending on the past, in practice may lead to problems of 
interpretation of the coefficients of the future X's." 
Third, because military expenditures may simply act as a 
proxy for government expenditures, separate regressions exam· 
ined (when available) figures on government consumption 
and/ or public sector capital formation. If the results were 
significantly different using these other forms of public spend-
ing, we concluded that the defense/growth relationship was 
unique and not spurious. 
Finally, as with all econometric tests of this sort, sample 
size becomes a problem. Clearly, one must place more confidence 
in the results for the entire time period (usually 1955-1988) 
than in those for the sub-periods. One consolation is that the 
small sample performances of the Granger tests are superior to 
those of alternative causal schemes-the Sims and Modified 
Sims procedures (Guilkey all.d Samemi, 1982: 679). 
The results of the causality analysis for the regional arms 
race exhibited several interesting patterns. Of prime importance 
is the direction of defense expenditure impact on the domestic 
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·1 t t s Still several broad trends are appar-
combatants or oi s a e · ' 
ent: 
1 D . the mid-1950s, defense expenditures de~eler­ated~:!ewhat following the mobilizati?n ~ter inde-
d The net result was a contraction in defense 
pen ehnce. f GDP from 6 3% in 1953 to 3.7% in 1962. 
as as areo · 
2 Beginning in 1963, a fairly rapid expansion took 
iace, with rates of growth reaching 9.7% (1963), 13.9% 
C1964), 60.8% (1965) and 19% (1966). By 1966, the 
share of defense expenditures in GDP had reached 6.8 
percent. 
3 The increase in defense expenditures leveled off over 
the 1967-1977 decade. As a result, .their ~hare o~ GDP 
. d about constant, increasing slightly m the ::;i~;70s, but ending at approximately its 1967 level, 
5.6 percent. 
4 S. 1978 defense expenditures have shown a rapid ~di~:~tinuo~s expansion, averaging 10.7%, so that, by 
1988, they were 7 .2% of GDP. 
. . d h ld that an arms race has While the conventional wis om o s . . 
xisted between Pakistan and India since partition (194 7), ther~ 
~s ample evidence that this pattern has bee~ somew~atp:~­
sided, with Indian defense expenditures affecting those in 
stan, but not vice versa: 
1 During the period as a whole (1955-1987), a pattern 
e~isted between changes in the two countries' ~~~ens~ 
burdens. A conventional arms race, ho~ever, i .. no 
. I . lndi' an defense expenditures elicited 
exist. ncreases in . · 
a positive Pakistani response. However, increase~ in 
the Pakistani defense burden actually resulted. in a 
mild contraction in Indian defense efforts (equation 1, 
Table 1). 
2. During the earlier period (1958:-1978), increas~s.: 
Indian defense spending resulted ma strong, pos~ti 
f P akistan This response occurred with a response rom · 
two-year lag (equation 2, Table 1). 
3 Finally, during the twenty-year period f~on: .196~ 
h h 1987 there was no statistically significan !e~~~~nship b~tween the growth in defense burdens of 
. .. n m-\..1~ 1'\ 
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A similar analysis using growth in military expenditures found 
almost the same picture. During the 1958-1987, 1958-1978 and 
1960-1980 periods, Indian defense expenditures stimulated 
(with a three-year lag) a follow-on expansion of Pakistani de-
fense expenditures (equations 4, 5, and 6, Table 1). 
As with the growth in the defense burden, increases in the 
rate of growth of Indian defense expenditures resulted in a de-
cline in the growth of Pakistani defense expenditures. It is clear, 
therefore, that the recent expansion in Pakistani defense expen-
ditures was not simply a response to stepped-up Indian militar-
ization. 
To learn how Pakistani defense expenditures have affected 
the country's pattern of growth, similar causality tests examined 
the relationship between defense and various macroeconomic 
indicators. As a basis of comparison, the analysis examined time 
periods corresponding roughly to those selected for the Indian/ 
Pakistani arms race analyses. 
In general, defense expenditures in Pakistan have impacted 
differently than non-defense government allocations. This holds 
for the growth in expenditures (Table 2). This conclusion is not 
dependent on variable definition-nearly identical results (not 
shown) occurred for the growth in expenditure share of Gross 
Domestic Product. 
1. Over the entire period, 1958-1988, there was no 
statistically significant relationship between the 
growth in either (a) total military expenditures (equa-
tion 1, Table 2), or (b) the military burden and the rate 
of growth of real Gross Domestic Product. 
2. For the 1958-1978 period, however, increases in 
both the defense burden and military expenditures 
(equation 2, Table 2) impacted negatively on GDP. 
3. Finally, for the most recent twenty-year period, the 
relationship between defense and GDP has shifted. 
Instead of affecting GDP, defense expenditures have 
themselves expanded (equation 3, Table 2) with the 
extra resources provided by the country's steady and 
rapid economic expansion. 
4. In contrast, government allocations to non-military 
activities have not had an impact on the aggregate 
economy. Similarly, they seem unaffected by changing 
economic conditions (equations 4-9, Table 2). 
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TABLE 1 
South Asia Arms Races: 
Country Causality Tests 
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relevant sign, and the fourth is t e a JUS e 
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TABLE 2 
Pakistan: Causality Between Government 
Expenditures and Gross Domestic Product, 1958-1988 
(Final Prediction Error) 
Dependent Var GDP GDP GEXP GEXP Independent Var GDP GEXP GEXP GDP 
Defense Expenditures/Gross Domestic Product 
1. 1958-1988 23.85 24.76 149.91 158.71 (no relationship) 1 year 2 years 2 years 1 year (·) (·) (·) (+) 2. 1958-1978 16.73 15.37 228.40 251.07 (defense .... GDP) 1 year 2 years 2 years 1 year (·) (·) (·) (·) 3. 1968-1988 26.78 29.40 31.67 28.42 (GDP .... defense) 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year (-) (·) (+) (+) 
Total Government Expenditures/Gross Domestic Product 
4. 1958-1988 23.85 25.37 142.26 147.86 (no relationship) 1 year 3 years 1 year 2 years (·) (+) (·) (+) 5. 1958-1978 16.73 18.23 189.52 205.01 (no relationship) 1 year 1 year 1 year 2 years (·) (·) (·) (+) 6. 1968-1988 26.78 28.81 65.35 66.99 (no relationship) 1 year 3 years 1 year 2 years (·) (+) (·) (+) 
Non-Defense Government Expenditures/Gross Domestic Product 
7.1958-1988 23.85 25.20 264.70 278.54 (no relationship) 1 year 1 year 1 year 2 years (·) (·) (·) (+) 8. 1958-1978 16.73 18.16 334.45 352.24 (no relationship) l year 1 year 1 year 2 years (·) (-) (·) (+) 9. 1968-1988 26.78 29.31 166.62 172.14 (no relationship) 1 year 1 year 1 year 2 years ( ·) (+) (·) (+) 
Note: GDP is the annual growth in Gross Domestic Product; GEXP is the annual 
growth in government expenditures (defense, total government expenditures, and 
non-defense expenditures). The first entry in each cell is the estimated coefficient, 
the second is the optimum lag, and the last is the relevant sign. 
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From these patterns, it appears that Pakistani defense 
expenditures impact on the economy as a whole only during 
periods when the country is responding to an Indian military 
build-up. During normal periods, defense expenditures appear to 
respond to changing economic conditions, rather than to cause 
economic change. It also appears that the fruits of increased 
economic growth have tended to be shared more with defense 
than with non-military government programs. 
Another pattern of importance involves the relationship 
between defense and non-defense expenditures. There has been 
a tendency over time for defense expenditures to lead in the 
timing of government allocations. That is, when defense expen· 
ditures change, a corresponding adjustment also occurs in 
allocations to non-defense activities. As with the other patterns 
cxnmincd Rbovc, this rclntionship hns drnngcd in recent yenrs 
(Table 3): 
1. For the period as a whole, changes in defense expen· 
ditures tended to precede those of total government 
expenditures with about a two-year lag (equation 1, 
Table 3). For non-defense expenditures, the lag aver· 
aged about one year (equation 4, Table 3). 
2. This pattern was also present in the earlier (1958-
1978) period (equations 2 and 4, Table 3). 
3. Still, during the more recent period, there has not 
been a statistically significant causal relationship be-
tween defense and non-defense allocations (equations 3 
and 6, Table 3). 
These findings are consistent with the pattern found above, 
where in the last twenty years or so, increased economic growth , . 
has gone in large part to defense, not non-defense, categories as 
a whole. 
Most likely, these patterns reflect the country's two basic 
fiscal constraints: a narrow tax base and the heavy commitment 
of expenditures on two current items, defense and debt service. 
Both of these categories appear to be irreducible and have 
continued to increase rapidly during a period of increased fiscal 
constraints. The federal budget itself has two main parts. The 
ordinary budget includes current expenditure, while the devel-
opment or annual development plan (ADP) covers capital invest-
. • • • ---- __ ... ----~~" A nn..-Hnn of federal income 
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Current expenditure accounts for the major part of total expen-
diture, averaging 65-75 percent in recent years. 
Defense expenditure and debt service together accounted for 
72. 7% of current expenditures in the 1988/89 budget. The pro-
portion of spending devoted to social items is low and apparently 
being squeezed by the demands of defense and debt service. The 
debt service burden continues to increase, reaching 36% of 
current expenditures in the 1988/89 budget. In practice, the 
government regularly revises the ADP downwards in light of: (a) 
reduced flows of foreign aid, and (b) local resources. 
TABLE 3 
Pakistan: Causality Between Defense 
Expenditures and Government Expenditures, 1958-1988 
(Final Prediction Error) 
Dependent Var GENDF GENDF DEF DEF 
Independent Var GENDF DEF DEF GENDF 
Defense Expenditures/Total Government Expenditures 
1. 1958-1988 142.26 94.67 149.91 159.89 
(def .... gov exp) 1 year 2 years 2 years 1 year 
(-) (+) (·) (+) 
2. 1958-1978 189.52 119.40 228.40 251.84 
(def-+gov exp) 1 year 2 years 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (·) 
3. 1968-1988 65.54 67.65 31.67 34.71 
(no relationship) 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year 
(·) (+) (+) (+) 
Defense Expenditures/Non-Defense Expenditures 
4. 1958-1988 264.70 231.17 149.91 160.01 
(def .... non-def) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (+) 
5. 1958-1978 334.45 290.09 228.40 251.59 
(def-+ non-def) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (·) 
6. 1968-1988 166.63 180.55 31.68 34.71 
(no relationship) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (-) 
Note: GENDF is the annual growth in total government expenditures and 
non-defense expenditures. DEF is the annual growth in defense expenditures. The 
first entry in each cell is the estimated coefficient, the second is the optimum lag, 
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. d f 1958-1978 (equations , , , an 
tionship over the per10 ~om however increases in defense 
5, Table 4). In more ;ecen year:~ be relat~d to the expansion in 
and the defense bur en appe~tern has been one of increases in 
government debt. Here, the_ p . de.cense and the defense 
. ( later) increases in i 
debt causmg ~ yea; d 6 Table 4). One possible interpretation 
burden ( equati~ns anh ' nt contracts for funds before 
of this pattern is that t e governme . 
TABLE 4 
Pakistan: Causality Between•Defen~e 
Fxµcnditurcs and Totnl Government Debt, 1958-1987 
'· (Final Prediction Error) 
Dependent Var DEBT DEBT DEF DEF 
Independent Var DEBT DEF DEF DEBT 
Defense Expenditures/Total Debt 
1. 1958-1987 309.05 321.86 154.34 162.48 
(no relationship) 1 year 2 years 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (·) 
2. 1958-1978 414.21 440.86 228.40 249.83 
(no relationship) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (·) 
3. 1967-1987 425.00 458.71 49.73 45.81 
(debt-def) 1 year 3 years 1 year 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (·) 
Defense Burden/Total Debt 
4. 1958-1987 309.05 315.82 152.72 163.31 
(no relationship) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (+) 
5. 1958-1978 414.21 427.55 229.65 252.51 
(no relationship) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (+) 
6. 1967-1987 425.00 446.40 40.47 40.27 
(debt-def) 1 year 1 year 2 years 1 year 
(·) (+) (·) (·) 
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making firm commitments to expand allocations to defense. 
Specifically, the authorities do not use increases in defense 
expenditures as the rationale for increased borrowing needs. 
The relationship between non-defense expenditures and 
debt (not shown here) is much more straightforward. 
1. For the period as a whole, non-defense expenditures 
preceded changes in total government debt by about a 
year. 
2. Interestingly enough, increases in non-defense ex-
penditures reduced the expansion in debt. That is, 
increases in non-defense expenditures had, with a one-
year lag, a negative impact on the growth in total real 
government debt. 
3. In recent years (1967-1987), there has been little or 
no relationship between non-defense expenditures and 
the growth in public sector debt. 
These contrasting patterns ofrelationship between debt and 
public sector expenditures reflect, in part, the interaction of 
Pakistani revenues and expenditures. Again, defense and 
non-defense expenditures exhibit dissimilar patterns (Table 5): 
1. For the period as a whole, increases in revenues 
facilitated increased defense expenditures. Again, this 
occurred after a one-year lag (equation 1, Table 5). This 
pattern also occurred in the 1958-1978 period (equa-
tion 2, Table 5). 
2. In more recent times (1968-1988), defense expendi-
tures and revenues have become intertwined. Increased 
defense expenditures expand revenues (with about a 
four-year lag period). In turn, augmented revenues in-
crease defense expenditures. Here the lag averaged 
about two years (equation 3, Table 5). 
3. Non-defense expenditures have not displayed a caus-
al relationship with revenues over the period as a 
whole (equations 4 and 5, Table 5). Still, in the last 
twenty years or so, they have tended to precede reve-
nues (equation 6, Table 5), but were not in turn en-
hanced by revenue expansion. 
4. Aggregating both defense and non-defense into total 
C7/'\'tF.o-..-- .-.-L -----
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TABLE 5 
Pakistan: Causality Between 
G rnment Expenditures and Revenues, 1958-1988 
ove . E ) (Final Prediction rror 
GEXP GEXP GREV 
GREV 
Dependent Var 
GEXP GREV GREV 
GEXP 
Independent Var 
Defense Expenditures I Government Revenues 
149.91 143.80 
1. 1958-1988 161.85 167.41 2 years 1 year 
(revenues -def) 1 year 2 years (+} (-) (-) (+} 
264.44 228.40 223.79 2. 1958-1978 243.76 1 year 2 years 1 year (revenues-def) 4 years (+} (-) (-) .(-) 
70.-1\l :11.117 28.f>:I 
:I. tH<lH l!lHH 82.82 2 years 4 ycnrs 1 year (fccdliuck) 1 ycur (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Non-Defense Expenditures/ Government Revenues 
264.70 280.57 
4. 1958-1988 161.85 172.65 1 year 1 year 1 year (no relationship) 1 year (-) (-) (+) (-) 
268.49 334.45 364.62 5. 1958-1978 243.76 1 year 1 year 1 year (no relationship) 1 year (-) (-) (-) (-) 
81.27 166.63 183.35 6. 1968-1988 82.82 1 year 1 year 1 year (non-def-rev) 1 year (+) (+) (+) (-) 
Total Government Expenditures I Government Revenues 
151.80 161 85 172.65 142.26 7. 1958-1988 . 1 year 1 year 1 year (no relationship) 1 year (+) 
(-) (+) (-) 
268.48 189.52 208.74 8. 1958-1978 243.76 1 year 1 year 
(no relationship) 1 year 2 years (+) (-) (-) (-) 
85.20 65.54 71.79 9. 1968-1988 82.82 1 year 1 year 1 year (no relationship) 1 year (+) 
(+) (+) (-) 
wth in overnment expenditures (defense, non-defense, 
Note: GEXP is the annual gro hg 1 th in government revenues. The d·t ) GREV is t e annua grow . and total expen 1 ures · . - d ffi ient the second is the optimum lag, 
first entry in each cell is the estimate coe ic ' 
and the last is the relevant sign. 
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9, Table 5). 
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The series of debt/expenditure/revenues findings summa-
rized above is suggestive of the general budgetary process in 
Pakistan. Specifically, during periods when the government feels 
it must increase allocations to the military to counter increased 
Indian militarization, it allocates a larger share of its expanded 
revenues to the military. The authorities do not contract debt 
specifically for this purpose, however, perhaps because of the 
obvious difficulties of securing commercial funding for this type 
of activity. During these periods, the government confines its 
borrowing to support an expanded level of non-defense type 
activities. 
In contrast, during periods when defense expenditures occur 
for reasons other than an increase in the perceived threat from 
India, the government apparently has the luxury of exploring 
alternative sources of financing. In the short run, it expands 
allocations to the military largely from increased revenues. If 
the magnitude of defense expenditures outruns the financial 
capacity of the government, the authorities turn to debt financ-
ing to complete the defense procurement process. 
INDIA 
While it is unlikely that Pakistani defense expenditures 
have had an appreciable effect on those of India, it is still appar-
ent that changes in defense policy and planning in India have 
usually arisen from the experience of war and perceptions of 
continuing hostility on the part of its neighbors. Still, the 1970s 
witnessed a substantial change in the Indian approach to de-
fense planning (Thomas, 1984: 239). 
This change occurred when the authorities perceived domes-
tic political unrest as undermining the security of the nation as 
much as external threats, This belief may have existed in the 
past, but only in more recent years has the security policy-
making organization dealt with such considerations. 
Other changes in Indian defense planning have come about 
through the gradual broadening and growing sophistication of 
the Indian economic and technological base (Thomas, 1984: 239). 
Military self-reliance, at least in certain sectors of Indian de-
fense programs-notably the procurement of weapons for the 
Indian army and the anticipated use of the country's military 
industries as major foreign exchange earners-increasingly is 
becoming a f~rtn .. ;.,..+i.,~--:- - -'-1~ -
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Within this context, Indian defense expenditures have 
shown remarkable stability over the 1952-1987 period: 
1. Defense expenditures had a low of 1.8% of GDP in 
1953 and 1956, but their high was only 3.8% (1987). 
2. Relatively low defense burdens (averaging around 
1.9% of GDP) characterized the 1950s. The rapid rise in 
defense expenditures in 1962 (38.2%) and 1963 (63.8%) 
increased the defense burden into the 3 percent range 
for most of the 1960s. Yet with strong economic growth, 
the country's defense burden had fallen to 2.9% by 
1969. 
3. Since 1970, defense expenditures have contracted in 
renl terms in only three yenrs: 197~12.3%, 1974-
6.3%, and 1980-6.2%. In all other years, defense has 
shown a steady expansion. The result has been an 
increase of the defense burden from 2.9% in 1970, to 
3.8% by 1987. 
4. The post-1981 increase in Indian defense expendi-
tures is unusual by historical standards, with defense 
increasing at somewhat greater rates than the economy 
as a whole. 
By 1980, defense expenditure was $9 billion, and the Indian 
military establishment wished to continue the newly developed 
defense trajectory with extensive spending beginning in 1981 
(Ward, 1990: 17). 
India produces under license most of its own military equip-
ment, including tanks and jet fighters. It produces military 
goods of sufficient technological quality to be competitive in 
many newly industrializing or less developed nations. Hard 
currency earned in this manner enables the country to import 
more advanced weapons and other military goods. India's desire 
to maintain or increase its status in the international defense 
community has an undeniable effect on its military budgeting 
and policy, in spite of somewhat significant economic con-
straints. As with Pakistan, causality tests attempted to establish the 
direction of linkage between Indian defense expenditures and 
economic growth. Has defense simply responded to the greater 
volume of resources provided by an expanding economy, or ------~;..,, ... ,.., ;nit.iated changes in the 
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;·For the period as a whole (equation 1 Table 6) d 
1ense affected GDP wth ' ' e-
. gro rather than vice versa Th. 
impact was positive and occurred with . is 
of approximately two years. an average lag 
2. The same patterns also characterized two tw 
year sub-periods, 1957-1977 and 1967-1987 I e~t[~ 
cases (equations 2 and 3 Table 6) th . · n ° fense wth ' ' e rmpact of de-o~ gro . was positive, with growth not si ifi-
cantly mfluencmg the government's allocations t~the 
TABLE 6 
E 
. India: Causality Between Defense 
xpend1tures and G D . . ross omest1c Product, 1957-1987 
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Note: DEF is the annual rate of growth of de~ . 
rate of growth in the Gross Domest' Prod ense expenditures. GDP is the annual e~timated coefficient, the second is :~e t'uct. The first entry in each cell is the 
sign. op imum lag, and the last is the relevant 
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military. A minor difference occurred when the defense-
to-growth link occurred with only a one-year lag in the 
earlier, 1957-1977, period. 
3. Similar results (equations 4, 5, and 6, Table 6) oc-
curred using the defense burden (the share of defense 
expenditures in GDP), the only difference being the 
1957-1977 period, where a feedback effect occurred 
from GDP to defense. This feedback had an average lag 
of three years and was negative. 
A somewhat different pattern (not shown) occurred using 
both total government expenditures and government consump· 
ti on in place of allocations to defense: 
1. For all three time periods, 1957-1987, 1957-1977, 
and 1967-1987, a feedback effect occurred with total 
government expenditures, whereby they impact posi-
tively, with a long lag, on GDP. In turn, GDP growth 
affected (negatively) total government expenditures, 
with a shorter (1-2-year) lag. 
2. Similar patterns occurred using government con-
sumption. In this case, as one might imagine, the lags 
were shorter. 
These findings are consistent with those obtained by other 
researchers. Ward et al. (1990) have developed a formal model 
of the economy in which the impact of defense expenditures over 
the period 1950 to 1987 occur within the context of a Mintz. 
Huang neoclassical growth model. In this model, defense im-
pacts directly on both growth and investment. 
Besides government expenditures, both military and non-
military, economic growth is also a function of the growth in: (a) 
investment, and (b) increases in labor productivity. The main 
findings of Ward et al. indicate that investment and government 
spending both have a positive impact on growth. Separating 
government spending into military and non-military, they found 
that both had a direct, strong, and positive effect on economic 
growth in the short run. In addition, they concluded that non-
military expenditures had about a one-third greater impact on 
GDP than military expenditures. 
The Ward model. links new investment to production and 
government spending-both military and non-military-as well 
cc fn +ho A.oT"\ .... an;a+;._rr la"IJ'ol _.; nn.T"\;+.nl C'l4--l"tlr rri.._;·n .f---.,,1,.,,+;.....__ \.......,,... 
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military expend 't · fl . lures m uence mvestme t d . 
run, GDP growth Their r d. n , an m the longer 
sumption in India driv mdmgs ~uggest that: (a) private con-
es own investment (b) 
spending, both military and .1. , government 1 1 . non-mi itary occu 'th h' h eves of investment and ()th . , rs w1 lg er 
ment levels. ' c e capital stock increases invest-
It is especially interesting that both milit .. 
tary government expenditur d ary and non-m1h-
findings suggest that th h ::: pro uce ~a~orable effects. These 
ing is positive in Indiae :,i~h ·;;:n m~ltipher of military spend-
hanced economic growth' i' th 1 e spmoff effect providing en-
. n e onger run 
Indian defense expenditures a . 
impact on growth and · t ppear to have a beneficial 
have been a very heavy i:::eers oi:e:t,. although historically they 
Terhal's (1982) analysis oft f reign exch~ge. For example, 
the total foreign exchan he ~950-1972 period concluded that 
al . ge requirements for def, . 
ent m value to nearly half th I d. . ense were equ1v-
and equipment. Terhal found th et dn i.an imh ports of machinery 
the level of these foreign ~ urmg t e 1960-1970 decade 
between 8% and 4.20A> of th ~xf~ ~tnge requirements oscillated 
D · h' e e ic1 on the balance f 
urmg t is period they averaged 200A (T h l o payments. 
This apparent paradox the o 't' er ~, 1982: 256). 
expenditures on growth d, . pos1 ive impact of defense 
f, . an investment and th d · . 
ore1gn exchange from non-d f, . . . e ivers10n of 
ics of government expe d't e ense activities, reflect the dynam-
the Granger test to de~rml u.res tanh d public indebtedness. Using 
me e causal dir t · f ment expenditures and p bl' ec ion o govern-
that: u ic sector debt, it appears (Table 7) 
1. Defense expenditures appear to hav 
role .in increasing the count 's f, . e played a direct 
nominated debt. This findin 1ioldore1gn currency de-
the growth in d f, g s whether one uses 
Table 7) or the :r~:~ ~urd~?-texpenditure (equation 1, 
tion 2, Table 1). m mi 1 ary expenditures (equa-
2. For the 1957-1987 period as a . 
defense preceded incr . ~ ':hole, increases in 
. h eases in 10re1gn curr d b 
wit an average la of b ency e t 
and 2, Table 7). g a out three years (equations 1 
~~!~:~s!~:::~~v;:=::: relati~~ship has developed 
e_rnment's debt. Here. GrRna:~P_,:~--~~-e~ ~d. ~e gov-
62 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 11, NO. 2, 1991 
4 Movements in this type of foreign currency denomi-
~ted debt have tended to lead changes in go~ernment 
:x enditures by two years. In addition, the impact .on 
tofal government expenditures has been negative 
(equation 3, Table 7). . 
5 As a basis of comparison, Granger tests ex~m~ 
the linkages between defense and the growth m re 
"t l formation (investment) and debt. Here, no gross cap1 a · t 
relationship occurred with foreign currency denomma -
ed debt (equations 4 and 5, Table 7). 
TABLE 7 
India: Causality Between 
Expenditures and Govern~ent Debt, 1957-1987 











Defense Burden/ Foreign Currency Denominated Debt 
202 76 184.73 195.06 
2 years 1. 1957-1987 267.74 . (defense-DEBT) 4 years 3 years 1 year (+) (+) (+) (-) 
Defense Expenditures I Foreign Currency Denominated Debt 
267.74 164.84 200.98 214.55 1 year 2. 1957-1987 
(defense ..... DEBT) 4 3 Years 2 years years (+) (+) (+) (-) 
Total Government Expenditures/Foreign Currency Denominated Debt 
267.74 280.65 107.19 103.76 
3. 1957-1987 
(DEBT-.GOVEXP) 4 years 
(+) 
2 years 4 years 2 years 
(-) (-) (-) 
Gross Capital Formation Share of GDP/ Foreign Currency Denominated Debt 
267.74 287.87 36.78 38.81 
4. 1957-1987 
(no relationship) 4 years 1 year 2 yearll 1 year (+) (+) (-) (-) 
Gross Capital Formation/Foreign Currency Denominated Debt 
59.82 60.74 36.78 39.16 1 year 5. 1957-1987 
(no relationship) 4 1 Year 2 years years (+) (+) (-) (-) 
~ enditures DEBT is the annual 
Note: DEF is the annual rate of growth ~f d~_i:,n~~~.x~t..- ..,_, _:. ___ , ____ L __ ,. ._ .. 
rRt.P. n( urnwth in f"n~inn ,..,,,,.._..,....,,., ~""'..,.,.. .................. 
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These findings support the notion that government spend-
ing is a high priority for Indian development planners, so long 
as revenues expand fast enough to keep the so-called debt trap 
from overtaking macroeconomic conditions. Apparently this pat-
tern is fairly common in the developing world (Looney, 1987a, 
1989b). 
The findings above and those for Pakistan also suggest that 
a certain amount of fungibility may exist between debt and 
revenues in India (and that fungibility is greater than in the 
case of Pakistan). However, due to problems of measurement 
(McGuire, 1972) the issue of fungibility is controversial. The 
apparently higher degree of fungibility in India may arise from 
the fact that the monitoring costs of international lending insti-
tutions are higher there than in Pakistan. In any case, fungibili-
ty, together with the high priority given defense spending, 
allows the military to finance its acquisitions with foreign de-
nominated debt. Through this mechanism, the government 
finances defense expenditures without necessarily pre-empting 
the country's foreign exchange earnings from other types of 
development activity. The impact of defense expenditures on 
growth can therefore remain positive. Although not identified 
directly here, this positive impact presumably occurs through 
short-run direct Keynesian demand linkages (Looney, 1989c) 
and longer run supply-side spinoff-type effects (Deger and Sen, 
1983). 
There are apparently limits on how far the government will 
go in expanding its foreign currency denominated debt to fi-
nance military expenditures. In fact, there are several interest-
ing links between India's pattern of military expenditures and 
the country's development. For many years, India's primary sup-
plier was the Soviet Union. In part this relationship developed 
due to the Soviets' acceptance of Indian rupees, as well as hard 
currency as an exchange currency, and the existence of a barter 
system of payments. 
This situation was enhanced for the Soviets during the 
1980s as India experienced inflation, leading to a decline in 
their balance of payments position. First the Indian military 
was already familiar with Soviet equipment such as the MIG-27 
fighter jet. Additionally, the shortage of hard currency in the 
country meant that exchange in any medium besides the rupee 
would involve great difficulties with any purchase package pro-
posed by Western European natinnci ,._.,. n.~ TT_,.._ -
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dize the complementarity of defense expenditures and economic 
progress. Yet, the government seems aware of this, and, in 
February 1989, the Ministry of Defense increased arms exports 
to raise funds in hard currency to purchase high technology 
weapons systems from the West and upgrade the Indian mili-
tary forces. This promises to be an important trend in the 1990s 
(Ward, 1990: 17). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summing up, Pakistan's defense expenditures do not occur 
merely in response to Indian militancy. While this may have 
been true in the early years after independence, there is little 
evidence that this relationship exists any longer. The analysis 
above suggests that negative impact of defense on the economy 
may have stemmed from an overreaction· to Indian defense 
expenditures. The net result was to compress military alloca-
tions into too narrow a time frame to allow for an efficient 
transfer from the civilian sector. The fact that debt increases to 
cover unanticipated overruns in the defense budget supports 
· this interpretation. In addition, Pakistan's lack of a sizable 
defense industry sector negated the possibility of any positive 
military Keynesianism effects that could have provided a short-
run stimulus to the economy. 
In contrast, India appears to have had much better control 
over its allocations to defense. There is little evidence that Paki-
stan forced India into a regional arms race (although we did not 
test for Chinese defense expenditures), and until recently, 
Indian defense spending has not really grown much faster than 
the economy as a whole. These factors may have allowed India's 
sizable defense industry sector to benefit from military Keynesi-
anism effects while simultaneously remaining below the level 
consistent with efficient resource absorption. In short, even with 
three potentially hostile borders and wavering international 
alliances, India has managed to provide for its national defense 
at a cost that does not appear to have markedly impeded its 
economic progress, and may have aided the development of the 
industrial sector. 
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